私募股权趋势与发展之中国篇（英文版）.pdf

Definitive global law guides offering comparative analysis from top-ranked lawyers chambers GLOBAL PRACTICE GUIDES Private Equity China: Trends equity buyers expected a lower price, while sellers hoped for a rebound in market and a better finan- cial report. Despite the slow start to the year, Chinas economy is shifting into recovery mode, and there are signs of optimism. During the past few months, the Chinese stock markets performed beyond expectation, which has encouraged investors and fund manag- ers to look for opportunities in the PE/VC market. In addition, the COVID-19 outbreak has strengthened the focus on certain sectors, eg, healthcare, pharmaceutical, e-commerce, online education, semi-conductor and high technology, which will benefit from the societal shift of a post-COVID-19 era. r ole of s tate-o wned Capital In the first quarter of 2020, the state-owned capital played a dominant role in rejuvenating the PE/VC market of China. According to Zero2IPO Research, the average capital raised from state-owned limited partners was 7.53 times of that from private limited partners. In addition, state-owned general part- ners raised 65.7% of the total capital in the domestic fundraising market. The trend is unlikely to fade as the Chinese government expects the state-owned capital to continue to play an important role in developing the capital market and implementing industrial policies. However, state-owned capital is facing more red tape over its business activities. Among others, the government promulgated certain provisions on the registration of state-owned equity of limited partner- ship enterprises, which will lead to a more stringent regulatory framework. If a state-owned investor is to be involved in fund- raising or PE/VC acquisition, the fund managers are advised to draw-out decision-making processes and consider the special requirements for protection of state-owned assets. merger Clearance r eview in pe/v C d eals In the first half of 2020, the State Administration for Market Administration (SAMR) publicly announced two penalty cases involving the acquisition of minority stake for the relevant transacting parties failure to submit declaration for merger clearance review in accordance with law. The SAMR took the view that the acquiring parties aimed to gain control (whether alone or in concert with others) over the target companies. It is expected a number of similar transactions will invite increasing attention or challenge from the regulatory authorities. Acquisition of a minority stake in a target by investors (financial or strategic) may still trigger the acquiring partys obligation of declaring to SAMR for merger clearance review, if the acquiring party gains control over through the transaction and any statu- tory threshold is satisfied. The test for “control” should take into account various legal and factual factors, including, among oth- ers, voting mechanism of shareholders or board meetings. Thus, if an investor who acquired minority interest is granted, under the shareholders agreement and/or articles of associations of the target, a right to veto on certain significant operational mat- ters of the target (eg, business plan, budget, appointment and removal of CEO and CFO, branch/subsidiary setup and close- down), it may be viewed as acquiring de facto control over the target, alone or in concert with others. To manage the risk of triggering merger clearance, the acquir- ing party should think carefully to narrow down the scope of “veto” matters so as to avoid being regarded as taking control of the targets daily operation. Where substantial risk of failure to obtain merger clearance exists with a particular transaction, an acquiring party may consider: making the receipt of merger clearance a condition prec- edent for it to close the deal and asking for a breakup fee from the selling party/target; and requiring the selling party/target to redeem the purchased shares of the acquiring party with agreed annual return if the transaction is invalidated or unwound by order of SAMR after the closing. 3 TreNds ANd d evelopmeNT s CHINA Contributed by: Steven Yu, Jeffrey Zhu, Liam Yu and Jia Guo, Global Law Office The VIE structure In the past, the legality of the variable interest entity (VIE) struc- ture was a grey area. Before the SAMR took on the responsibility for merger clearance review, it was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which also reviews and approves foreign investment. As MOFCOM would not validate a VIE structure, it refused to officially accept such declarations. This practice has not changed much since the SAMR took over merger review responsibility. However, in April 2020, the SAMR released public notice of a case (the “SMZ Case”) in which one of the transacting parties has a VIE structure. Whether this means that the SAMR is now completely open to VIE declara- tion remains unseen, but the SMZ Case may signal that VIE arrangements can obtain formal recognition from PRC regula- tory authorities (or at least from SAMR) and will no longer constitute an obstacle to the making of merger clearance review. Impact of Foreign Investment l aw On 1 January 2019, the Foreign Investment Law of the Peoples Republic of China (“Foreign Investment Law”), together with its implementation regulations, took effect and replaced the “Sino-foreign Joint Venture Enterprise Law” , the “Sino-foreign Cooperative Enterprise Law” and the “Foreign Enterprise Law” (collectively the “Three Foreign Enterprise Laws”). The Foreign Investment Law has an impact on share acquisition of Chinese targets by foreign PE/VC firms in China (“foreign acquisition”) in the following major aspects: Foreign acquisition and the “negative list” Foreign acquisition not falling under the scope of the “Nega- tive List” for foreign investment will only follow a mechanism of information reporting to MOFCOM through SAMR instead of a long-standing separate filing procedure with MOFCOM. This shift shows great improvement on the efficiency of admin - istration of foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) throughout the process from its incorporation to subsequent changes (if any). PRC Company Law governance requirements As the Foreign Investment Law calls on an FIE to adopt a cor- porate governance structure compliant with PRC Company Law within the five-year transitional period starting 1 January 2020, many Chinese companies, after becoming an FIE by foreign acquisition, can retain its existing governance structure, which may bring some favorable changes to forging PE/VC firms. For instance, under the Three Foreign Enterprise Laws, the board of directors is the highest decision-making authority of a Sino- foreign joint venture (JV); this is now the shareholders meeting, thereby making it feasible for foreign PE/VC firms to have a say or even veto at the shareholder level. Another good example is that, under the Three Foreign Enter- prise Laws, any equity transfer in a JV is subject to unanimous consent of all other parties to the JV which cannot be circum- vented by private agreement; such restriction is lifted with the implementation of Foreign Investment Law and more flexibility could be available to foreign PE/VC firms for their planning of investment exit. VIE arrangements The Foreign Investment Law does not address the VIE issue as anticipated by most of the market practitioners; the legisla- tive and regulatory authorities are reluctant to clearly regulate foreign investment through a VIE structure. That means a VIE arrangement typically employed by foreign PE/VC firms for their indirect investment in China in those restricted industrial sectors is safe for the time being. However, it is still worth noting the definition of “foreign investment” under the Foreign Investment Law shall mean any investment activity “directly or indirectly” carried out by foreign investors within the PRC territory, including foreign investors acquiring shares, equity interests, shares of property or “other similar interest” in a Chinese target. According to this defini- tion, China will adopt a “penetrating administration” system, regulating various kinds of foreign investments. Therefore, VIE arrangements can, theoretically, be covered under the scope of “foreign investment” , and there might be a possibility that the Chinese authorities may bring the VIE issue into the regulatory net under the Foreign Investment Law and take an active role in supervising it when they see fit. Investment and capital Although it remains unseen whether or not the concept of “total investment amount” and the compulsory ratio of “total investment” to “registered capital” of an FIE in the context of Three Foreign Enterprise Law will be abolished, in practice, FIEs are treated equally with purely Chinese enterprises in terms of receiving capital from investors in their equity financings and are no longer subject to the cap of “total investment amount” when receiving capital from abroad. However, as China is yet a country of foreign exchange control, capital inflow and injec- tion into a Chinese target by foreign PE/VC firms based on a valuation of PE multiples, especially where the valuation is well above the net assets of the target, may still be subject to a case- by-case scrutiny by the compete State Administration of Foreign Exchange. e merging s Funds in Chinas pe/v C market The secondary fund, also known as the S fund, provides an alter- native exit approach to the LPs besides IPO and M however, there are still not many S funds in the market. According to a report of the FOF Research Center, as of 8 December 2019, there are approximately 17 S funds with a total asset management amount of about RMB31 billion. S funds are still in the early stages in China. In 2020, TR capi- tal, with a group of buyers, closed an S fund transaction with Kinzon Capital, a well-known Chinese VC firm, with a first- stage closing amount of about USD100 million. The transaction draws lots of attention and discussion in the practitioners of the PE/VC market. Greater numbers of S fund transactions are for- seen, and such transactions would be considered an important way to exit to the GPs and LPs in the PE/VC market of China. l atest Update on v alidity of the v Am Clause in China The Valuation Adjustment Mechanism (“VAM Clause”) is commonly adopted in equity financing agreements between an investor and a financing raiser. The V AM Clause is introduced to mitigate the uncertainty of the future development of the target company. The adjustment mechanism normally would be share compensation, share repurchase and cash compensation or both in a combined manner for the benefit of investors to cover the potential loss resulting from the adjustment to the valuation of the target company in the future. In terms of the parties to VAM agreements, there are agree- ments between, among others, investors and existing sharehold- ers, between investors and target companies, and between inves- tors on one side and both the existing shareholders of target companies and the target companies on the other side. The Haifu case and subsequent examples In Haifu Investment Co, Ltd vs Gansu Shiheng Non-ferrous Resources Recycle Limited (the “Haifu Case”), the Supreme Peoples Court (SPC) hheld that the V AM clause among share- holders is valid and enforceable, but VAM clause between the investors and the target company invalid and unenforceable. The Haifu Case has profound impact on the investment prac- tice and also provokes long discussion in the PE/VC industry. After the Haifu Case, most of the V AM Clauses adopted by the investor have been structured as the arrangement between the shareholders to enhance their enforceability. After the Haifu Case, there are following judgements that ruled on other aspects of the validity of the VAM Clause. In Qiang Jingyan vs Cao Wubo and Shandong Hanlin Biotech Limited (the “Qiang Jingyan Case”), and Tonglian Capital Manage- ment Limited vs Chengdu New Direction Technology Limited and Sichuan Jiuyuan New Direction Intelligence Technology Limited (the “Tonglian Case”), the SPC held the opinion that if all necessary internal approvals are duly obtained, the guar- antee provided by the target company against the obligation of the controlling shareholder under the VAM Clause could be deemed to be valid and enforceable. Ninth Minutes of Trial Work Conference In Jiangsu Huagong Venture Capital Co Ltd vs Yangzhou Met- alforming Machine Tool Co Ltd (the “Huagong Case”), the court changed the position on the validity of the VAM Clause between the investors and the target company, and opined that VAM Clause between the investors and the target company is not necessarily invalid. On 11 November 2019, the SPC released Notice by the Supreme Peoples Court of Issuing the Minutes of the National Courts Civil and Commercial Trial W ork Conference (“Ninth Minutes of Trial W ork Conference”). This further developed the reason- ing in the Huagong Case. The VAM Clause between the target company and the investor was not deemed to be completely invalid if the investor requests the target company to repurchase its shares and does not completed the capital reduction proce- dures properly, the request will not be supported by the court. In other words, the V AM Clause might be deemed to be valid, but remain unenforceable. It should be noted that the PRC judicial system is not a case law system; the judgements of the SPC and the high peoples counts at provincial level (“High Courts”) are not legally bind- ing upon the lower courts, but would highly likely to be adopted or referenced by the lower courts in their trials of similar cases considering the status of the SPC and the High courts in the judicial system. Similarly, Ninth Minutes of Trial Work Con- ference is not a legally binding judicial interpretation, but SPC explicitly stipulates in this guiding document that courts may reason according to its provisions when specifically analysing the reasons for the application of law in adjudicative instru- ments, which means in practice it would still have strong guid- ance effect on the lower courts.