WILL to FIGHT Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Dont Michael J. McNerney, Ben Connable, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Marek N. Posard, Jasen J. Castillo, Dan Madden, Ilana Blum, Aaron Frank, Benjamin J. Fernandes, In Hyo Seol, Christopher Paul, Andrew Parasiliti C O R P O R A T I O N NATIONALLimited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit rand/pubs/permissions. 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Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russoiii Preface This report documents research and analysis as part of a project titled Assessing and Influencing National Will to Fight, which is sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training, U.S. Army (G-3/5/7). The pur- pose of the project was to provide a generalizable analytic method to assess national will to fight, to use that method to provide an assessment in a Korean Peninsula scenario and a scenario involving Russia and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and to provide recommendations for the best methods to influence national will to fight. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD167561. This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Centers Strategy, Doc- trine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corpora- tion, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and com- plies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Instruc- tion 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RANDs Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government.v Contents Preface . iii Figures and Tables .vii Summary . ix Acknowledgments . xix Abbreviations . xxi CHAPTER ONE What Is Will to Fight and Why Does It Matter? . 1 Purpose of the Study . 1 What Is Will to Fight? . 4 Does Will Really Matter in Practice? . 6 U.S. Experience with National Will to Fight .10 Recognizing How Will to Fight Matters .13 Can National Will Be Analyzed? .15 Using Mixed Methods Is the Best Approach to Understanding Will .16 Structure of the Report .18 CHAPTER TWO Why Do Governments Persevere in War? .21 A Word About Our Literature Review .21 A Word About Frameworks and Models . 22 From Framework to Exploratory Model . 23 How to Measure National Will to Fight . 34 Hypotheses to Help Analyze the Variables in Our National Will to Fight Model. 36 CHAPTER THREE Exploring the Model Across the 20th Century .37 Purpose of the Case Studies .37 Case Study Summary .39 Unpacking Our Seven Factors . 42 Unpacking Our Four Contexts . 48vi National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Dont Unpacking Our Four Mechanisms .52 Conclusion . 56 CHAPTER FOUR The Korean Peninsula: Will to Fight and the Arc of History .59 Korean War .59 Contemporary National Will to Fight .71 Conclusion .79 CHAPTER FIVE Russian Will to Fight and the Arc of History .83 World War I .85 World War II . 87 First and Second Chechen Wars .91 Russia Today . 97 Conclusion . 104 CHAPTER SIX Findings and Recommendations . 109 Overall Findings . 111 Hypothesis 1: Factors . 112 Hypothesis 2: Contexts . 113 Hypothesis 3: Economics . 114 Hypothesis 4: Political Mechanisms . 114 Hypothesis 5: Capabilities and Casualties . 117 Recommendations . 117 Conclusion . 121 ONLINE APPENDIXES Available for download at rand/t/RR2477 A. What Our Literature Review Told Us B. Case Study Selection and Additional Details on Cases References . 123vii Figures and Tables FiguresS.1. National Will to Fight Framework .xiiS.2. Centers of Gravity and Variables in the National Will to Fight Exploratory Model .xiiiS.3. Summary of Overall Findings. xivS.4. Summary of Overarching Recommendations . xviS.5. Summary of Mechanism-Based Recommendations . xvii1.1. Definition of National Will to Fight . 51.2. Winston Churchill . 71.3. Ho Chi Minh . 91.4. 2015 National Military Strategy Continuum of Conflict Concept .122.1. National Will to Fight Framework . 242.2. Logic Chain Behind the National Will to Fight Framework . 242.3. Centers of Gravity and Variables in the National Will to Fight Exploratory Model .335.1. Russian WW I Propaganda Poster . 885.2. Soviet WW II Propaganda Poster .915.3. Contemporary Photographs of Vladimir Putin . 1025.4. Contemporary Russian Propaganda . 1035.5. Causal Chain to Affect Will to Fight When Stakes Are Low . 1075.6. Causal Chain to Affect Cohesion and Popular Support . 1085.7. Causal Chain to Affect Popular Support and Civil-Military Relations . 1086.1. National Will to Fight: A Portable Model . 1106.2. Hypotheses to Help Analyze the Variables in Our National Will to Fight Model . 1126.3. Centers of Gravity and Variables in the National Will to Fight Exploratory Model . 119viii National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Dont TablesS.1. Simplified National Will to Fight Exploratory Model .xii2.1. Simplified National Will to Fight Exploratory Model . 262.2. Definitions of Terms in the National Will to Fight Exploratory Model . 262.3. How Each Variable May Relate to National Will to Fight and to Other Variables .292.4. Measures of National Will to Fight .353.1. Examples in Which Failure to Accurately Assess Will to Fight Had Serious Consequences . 383.2. Overview of Case Studies and Key National Will to Fight Variables . 403.3. Political Factor Examples: Stakes . 433.4. Political Factor Examples: Cohesion . 443.5. Political Factor Examples: Popular Support . 443.6. Political Factor Examples: Allies .453.7. Political Factor Examples: Civil-Military Relations . 463.8. Economic Factor Examples: Leverage .473.9. Military Factor Examples: Capabilities . 483.10. Political Context Examples: Government Type .493.11. Political Context Examples: National Identity . 503.12. Economic Context Examples: Resilience .513.13. Military Context Examples: Conflict Duration .523.14. Political Mechanism Examples: Engagement .533.15. Political Mechanism Examples: Indoctrination and Messaging . 543.16. Economic Mechanism Examples: Pressure .553.17. Military Mechanism Example: Casualties . 564.1. Summary of National Will to Fight Variables, Korean War .635.1. Summary of Key Variables in Historical Russian Will to Fight . 845.2. Russian Public Opinion on Chechnya, 1995 and 1999 . 94ix Summary Wars rarely end simply because one military destroys another. Government leaders determine how and when wars end, and they may have to decide many times during a conflict whether their country should continue enduring risk and sacrifice or whether it is time to stop fighting. Tangible factors like remaining numbers of weapons and troops are obviously part of the decision calculus, but it is often less-tangible political and economic variables that ultimately determine what might be called national will to fight. The U.S. Army asked the RAND Arroyo Center to help U.S. leaders better understand and influence will to fight at both the national level and at the tacti- cal and operational levels. This report, along with a companion report, Will to Fight: Analyzing, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Military Units, 1documents the first steps in this multiyear effort. We define national will to fight as the determination of a national government to conduct sustained military and other operations for some objective even when the expecta- tion of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases. Although the range of actors relevant to national will includes citizens, mili- tary leaders, media, and foreign officials, we focus on governments and, in the process, account for the influences of these and other actors. Ultimately, governments make the decisions about war. Their will is reflected in the political decisions they make during a conflict to